William A. Fawcett v. Security Benefit Association : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1940
William A. Fawcett v. Security Benefit Association :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. C. Melville; A. W. Fulton; Harry L. Ladbury; Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant;
Romney, Romney and Boyer; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation




Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
WILLIAM A. FAWCETT, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
SECURITY BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Appellant's Brief 
APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
UTAH. 
P. C. EVANS, JUDGE. 
A. c. MELVILLE, 
A. w. FULTON, 
HARRY L. LADBURY, 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant. 
RoMNEY, RoMNEY and BoYER, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
FILED 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX AND BRIEF 
Page 
Statement . . . ........... . . ............ 1 
Statement of Facts ........... . . .. 2 
Agreed Statement of Facts ....... . . ...... 5 
Statement of Errors . . . ........ . . ..... 9 
Questions Involved .......... . . ............. 10 
Brief and Argument ...... . . ... 11 
I. THE ASSESSMENT PAID WHEN THE CERTIFI-
CATE WAS DELIVERED FEBRUARY 18, 1922, 
WAS FOR THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY, 1922, 
AND A NEW ASSESSMENT BECAME PAYABLE 
FOR -THE PERIOD COMMENCING ON THE 
FIRST DAY OF EACH SUCCEEDING MONTH .. 11 
(a) Fraternal Benefit Societies Operate on 
Monthly Assessment Basis . . . ............ 11 
Bacon on Life and Accident Insurance, Fourth 
Edition, p. 33 ................... 11 
White v. W. 0. W., 87 Utah 477, 50 P. (2d) 
422 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............. 12 
Jenkins v. Talbot, 338 Ill. 441, 170 N. E. 735 ... 12 
(b) Contract may fix premium due date prior to 
anniversary of effective date of Policy ........ 13 
32 C. J.Insurance, 1196,Sec. 329 ............ 13 
6 A. L. R. 77 5 ............................ 13 
6 A. L. R. 77 4 ............................ 14 
32 A. L. R. 1253 .......................... 14 
80 A. L. R. 957 ........................... 14 
111 A. L. R. 1420 ......................... 14 
Wolford, Adm'x. v. National Life Ins. Co., 114 
Kan. 411, 219 P. 263 .................... 14 
(c) The Contract provides for payments for each 
calendar month .......................... 15 
Sov. Camp W. 0. W. v. Rhyne, 171 Miss. 687, 
158 So. 472 ............................ 17 
Craig v. Golden Rule Life Ins. Co., 184 Ark. 48, 
41 s. w. (2d) 769 . . . . ................. 18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX AND BRIEF-Continued 
Page 
Moran v. Knights of Columbus, 46 Utah 397, 
151 Pac. 353 . . . . . . . . .19 
Kennedy v. M. W. A., 92 Utah 487, 69 P. (2d) 
508 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19 
Shira v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 90 Fed. (2d) 953 .. 21 
Frysh v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 214 Wis. 
453, 253 N. W. 184 ...................... 22 
Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 29 
F. (2d) 977, 979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
Sov. Camp W. 0. W. v. Reed, 94 S. W. 910 
(Ala.) ............................... 25 
Rybczynski v. Chicago Fraternal Life Assur-
ance Co., 277 .N. Y. S. 366 ................ 25 
Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Clark, 257 Ky. 
724, 79 S. W. (2d) 21, 97 A. L. R. 971 ...... 26 
(d) The construction placed upon the contract by 
the parties thereto is controlling ............ 30 
1 Couch on Insurance, p. 346. . ........ 31 
Scotten v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 336 Mo. 
724, 81 s. w. (2d) 313. . . . .......... 31 
32 C. J.Insurance, p. 1129, Sec. 233 .......... 33 
32 C. J. Insurance, p. 1139,Sec. 246.. . .34 
II. THE ENDORSEMENT ON THE CERTIFICATE 
CONSTITUTED A NEW CONTRACT ......... 35 
Kennedy v. M. W. A., 92 Utah 487, 69 P. (2d) 
508 .................................. 36 
III. PLAINTIFF IS ESTOPPED TO CLAIM THE 
CONTRACT DID NOT TERMINATE OCTOBER 
30, 1938 ............................ . 
32 c. J. 1139 ........ . 
.... 36 
37 
IV. UNDER THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT 
CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITU-
TION, THE LAWS OF KANSAS CONTROL THE 
RIGHT OF ALL MEMBERS OF DEFENDANT 
ASSOCIATION . . . 37 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX AND BRIEF-Continued 
Page 
Sup. Cl. Royal Arcanum v. Green, 35 S. Ct. 724, 
237 u. s. 531 .......................... 37 
M. W. A. v. Mixer, 45 S. Ct. 389, 267 U. S. 544. 37 
Sov. Camp W. 0. W. v. Bolin, 305 U. S. 66, 59 
S. Ct. 35 .............................. 37 
White v. W. 0. W., 87 Utah 477, 50 P. (2d) 
422 .................................. 38 
Wolford, Adm'x. v. National Life Ins. Co., 114 
Kan. 411, 219 P. 263 .................... 38 
CONCLUSION ................................. 39 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX OF CASES CITED 
Page 
Craig v. Golden Rule Life Ins. Co., 184 Ark. 48, 41 
s. w. (2d) 769 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
Fairchild-Gilmore-Wilton Co. v. Southern Refining Co., 
158 Cal. 264, 110 P. 951, 953. . . . . . . 28 
Frysh v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 214 Wis. 453, 
253 N. W. 184 . . . . . . . . . 22 
Jenkins v. Talbot, 338 Ill. 441, 170 N. E. 735 ........ 12 
Kennedy v. M. W. A., 92 Utah 487, 69 P. (2d) 508.19, 36 
Minn. Mu. L. Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 29 F. (2d) 977 ..... 24 
Moran v. K. of C., 46 Utah 397, 151 Pac. 353. . . . . .19 
M. W. A. v. Mixer, 45 S. Ct. 389, 267 U.S. 544.... . 37 
Rybczynski v. Chicago Fraternal Life Assurance Co., 
277 N. Y. S. 366. . . . . . ..... 25 
Scotten v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 336 Mo. 724, 81 
s. w. (2d) 313 . . . . . . . . . . ............. 31 
Shira v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 90 Fed. (2d) 953 ........ 21 
Sov. Camp W. 0. W. v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66, 59 S. Ct. 35.37 
Sov. Camp W. 0. W. v. Reed, 208 Ala. 457, 94 So. 910.25 
Sov. Camp W. 0. W. v. Rhyne, 171 Miss. 687, 158 So. 
472 ...................................... 17 
Supreme Council, Royal Arcanum v. Green, 35 S. Ct. 
724, 237 u. s. 531 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 
Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Clark, 257 Ky. 724, 79 
S. W. (2d) 21, 97 A. L. R. 971. . . . . . . . . ... 26 
White v. W. 0. W., 87 Utah 477, 50 P. (2d) 422 .. 12, 38 
Wolford Adm'x v. National Life Ins. Co., 114 Kan. 411, 
219 P. 263 ............................. 14, 38 
MISCELLANEOUS CITATIONS 
6 A. L. R. 774, 775. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13, 14 
32 A. L. R. 1253 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... 14 
80 A. L. R. 957. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14 
111 A. L. R. 1420 ............................... 14 
Bacon on Life and Accident Ins., 4th Ed. p. 33. . . . .11 
32 C. J. Insurance, p. 1129, Sec. 233. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 
32 C.J.Insuranc~ p. 1139, Sec. 246 ........... 34,37 
32 C. J. Insurance, p. 1196, Sec. 329. . ... 13 
1 Couch on Insurance, p. 346. . .... 31 
1 Couch on Insurance, p. 351. . . . . . . . . .. 31 
R. S. U., 1933, Section 43-9-6. . . . . . . . . . 6 
R. S. U., 1933, Section 82-2-12 (1) . . . . . . . ....... 26 
G. S. Kan. 1935, Section 77-201 (11) ............... 26 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
\VILLIA~I A. FAWCETT, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
SECURITY BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Appellant's Brief 
APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
UTAH. 
P. C. EVANS, JUDGE. 
STATEMENT. 
This is an action for death benefits based upon a 
Benefit Certificate issued by Defendant, a fraternal 
beneficiary society, to Harriett P. Fawcett February 
18, 1922. 
Mrs. Fawcett paid assessments each month until 
September, 1928. Her Certificate provided that upon 
default in payment of assessments after six years of 
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membership she would be entitled to ten years and 
thirty days extended insurance. Pursuant to her appli-
cation an endorsement to this effect was placed upon 
her Certificate, which endorsement further stated that 
the Certificate would expire October 30, 1938. Mrs. 
Fawcett died November 7, 1938, and after her death due 
and proper Proofs of Death were made by plaintiff, 
her beneficiary. 
For convenience the parties will be referred to in 
this Brief as they were designated in the Trial Court, 
William A. Fawcett as plaintiff, and The Security Bene-
fit Association as defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that on February 6, 
1922, Harriett P. Fawcett made application for mem-
bership in Milford Council No. 3611 of Defendant As-
sociation, and for a benefit Certificate in the sum of 
$1000.00 on the American Experience Twenty Pay Plan; 
that said application was approved and Defendant duly 
issued Benefit Certificate No. 911864, bearing date Feb-
ruary 14, 1922; that said Certificate was delivered to 
Harriett P. Fawcett February 18, 1922, at which time 
she paid $2.60, the amount of the first monthly con-
tribution on said Certificate, plus Local Council dues; 
that in addition to the first monthly payment plaintiff 
paid an equivalent of $2.60 each month from :\larch, 
1922, down to and including the month of September, 
1928; that said Certificate provided for extended pro-
tection for a period of ten years and thirty days ; that 
on January 6, 1929, Harriett P. Fawcett made applica-
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tion to Defendant for extended protection for said 
period. (Abst. 1-4} 
Plaintiff further alleged that the Certificate did 
not become effectiYe until delivered to and signed by 
the applicant during the applicant's good health; that 
the first monthly payment was made on February 18, 
1922, and covered a period from February 18, 1922, to 
~\[arch 18, 1922; that each payment thereafter fell due 
on the 18th day of each month, commencing with lVIarch 
18, 192:2, and covered a period of one month from the 
18th day of each month; that the last payment made 
covered the period from September 18, 1928, to Octo-
ber 18, 1928, and that Harriett P. Fawcett was entitled 
to extended insurance for a period of ten years and 
thirty days from October 18, 1928, or to November 18, 
1938; that she died on November 7, 1938, while the Cer-
tificate was in full force and effect. (Abst. 4-7) 
Defendant in its answer admitted the issuance of 
the Certificate and payment of assessments and Local 
Council dues at the time and in the manner alleged by 
plaintiff, but alleged that under the contract, which 
consisted of the application, the Certificate and the 
Constitution and Laws, the member was required to 
pay one assessment and Local Council dues for the 
month in which the Certificate was delivered, and there-
after to pay an assessment and Local Council dues on 
or before the last day of each succeeding month; that 
all assessments for each month became due and pay-
able on the first day of the month and members who 
failed to pay such assessment on or before the last day 
of the month became automatically suspended.· De-
fendant alleged that the assessment paid February 18, 
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1922, was for the month of February, 1922, the month 
in which the Certificate was delivered; that the assess-
ment for the month of March was due March 1, 1922, 
but that the members were given the right to pay said 
assessment on or before the last day of March; that 
the last assessment paid by Harriett P. Fawcett was 
for the month of September, 1928, and that she was 
granted extended insurance for ten years and thirty 
days from October 1, 1928; that pursuant to her appli-
cation, an endorsement was made providing that she 
was entitled to extended protection for ten years and 
thirty days from October 1, 1928; that said endorse-
ment further provided that the Certificate of member-
ship expired October 30, 1938; that Harriett P. Fawcett 
accepted and retained said certificate as amended, and 
thereby acquiesced in, accepted and ratified the terms 
of said contract as amended by said endorsement; that 
said Certificate expired October 30, 1938, and was there-
fore void and of no force or effect on November 7, 1938, 
the date of death of Harriett P. Fawcett. Defendant 
further alleged that as a Kansas corporation the rights 
and liabilities of all members are governed by the Laws 
of Kansas, and that under the Laws of Kansas, as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case 
of Wolford, Adm'x. v. National Life Insurance Co., 
114 Kan. 411, 219 P. 263, the date fixed in the contract 
for the payment of premiums governs, and the fact that 
the policy was not delivered on a date corresponding 
with the times specifically fixed for subsequent pre-
miums does not postpone the time for such payments to 
the anniversary of the date of the policy. Defendant 
pleaded that under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of 
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the United States Constitution, it was entitled to have 
the Laws of l{ansas, as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court of Kansas in said case, applied by the Courts 
of Utah in determining the rights of plaintiff and of 
defendant. (Abst. 7-18) 
Plaintiff's reply admitted the fraternal character of 
defendant, admitted the contract contained the language 
alleged in defendant's answer and reaffirmed the al-
legations of his complaint, and prayed for judgment in 
accordance with the prayer of his complaint, and prayed 
for reformation of the endorsement to correspond with 
the alleged intention of the parties if necessary. 
This case was tried upon an agreed statement of 
facts. This statement is short, so for the convenience 
of the Court we will set it out in full in this Brief: 
"AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
(Abst. 24-28. Trans. 17, 46) 
It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between 
the parties hereto, through their respective Attorneys 
of record, that the following facts may be considered by 
the Court as admitted and that no evidence thereon will 
be required: 
1. It is admitted that the defendant is and was at 
all times herein mentioned a fraternal benefit society, 
a corporation chartered, organized and operating under 
and by virtue of the Laws of the State of Kansas, and 
duly licensed and operating in the State of Utah as a 
fraternal benefit society under and by virtue of the 
Laws of the State of Utah relating to foreign fraternal 
benefit societies; that the defendant is a corporation 
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without capital stock, organized and carried on solely 
for the mutual benefit of its members and their bene-
ficiaries and not for profit; that it has a lodge system 
with ritualistic form of work and representative form 
of government, and makes provision for the payment 
of benefits in accordance with Section 43-9-6 of the 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. 
2. That on or about February 6, 1922, Harriett P. 
Fawcett made written application for membership in 
Milford Council No. 3611 of Defendant Association and 
a Benefit Certificate in the sum of $1000 on the Amer-
ican Experience Twenty Pay Plan; that a true and cor-
rect copy of said application is attached hereto, marked 
Exhibit "1 ", and made a part hereof as fully as though 
it were set out in full herein; that said application was 
duly approved by defendant, and said Association pur-
suant to said application duly issued Benefit Certificate 
No. 911864 in the amount of $1000, bearing date Feb-
ruary 14, 1922, a photostatic copy of which is hereto 
attached, marked Exhibit "2 ", and made a part hereof 
as fully as though set out in full herein; that the con-
tract between The Security Benefit Association and 
said Harriett P. Fawcett consisted of the Certificate, 
Exhibit '' 2 '' hereto, the application for membership, 
Exhibit "1 ", and the Constitution and Laws of De-
fendant Association, a true and correct copy of which 
is attached hereto, marked Exhibit "3 ", and made a 
part hereof. 
3. That Harriett P. Fawcett was thereafter in-
itiated and became a member of Defendant Association; 
that Defendant delivered said Certificate to Harriett P. 
Fawcett on February 18, 1922, during her good health; 
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that on ~aid date Harriett P. Fawcett signed said Cer-
tificate and acknowledged in writing· on said Certifi-
cate the delivery of the same to her, and at such time 
she paid to Defendant the sum of $2.60, which sum was 
the amount of the first n1onthly contribution on said 
Certificate as provided for therein, plus the amount 
of Local Council dues of Defendant Association. 
4. That in addition to the first monthly payment 
as above set forth, Harriett P. Fawcett paid to the 
Financier of the Defendant Association an equivalent 
of $2.60 each month from the month of March, 1922, 
down to and including the month of September, 1928, 
which sum included the monthly assessment payments 
on said Certificate, plus Local Council dues, the last 
payment thereon having been made September 30, 1928. 
5. That Harriett P. Fawcett was twenty-eight 
years of age, nearest birthday, at the time of the 
issuance of said Benefit Certificate; that according to 
the table of values, which is a part of said Certificate, 
after monthly payments were made on said Certificate 
for a period of six full years, the withdrawal equity 
value of said Certificate was sufficient to purchase ex-
tended insurance for ten years and thirty days; that on 
January 6, 1929, Harriett P. Fawcett made written ap-
plication for extended protection for said period; that 
a true and correct copy of said application for extended 
protection is attached hereto, marked Exhibit "4", and 
made a part of this Agreed Statement of Facts. 
6. T4at Harriett P. Fawcett thereupon delivered 
said Benefit Certificate No. 911864, together with said 
application for extended protection, to the Defendant 
Association for endorsement, and thereafter and on 
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January 18, 1929, pursuant to said application for ex-
tended protection, the Defendant Association placed the 
following ~ndorsement on said Certificate: 
"January 18, 1929. 
The Security Benefit Association, upon the re-
quest of the said Harriett P. Fawcett, hereby 
waives the periodical contributions stipulated in 
this Certificate of Membership and continues 
Whole Life Protection for death benefits only, in 
the sum of $1000.00 for ten years and thirty days 
from October 1, 1928, this Certificate of member-
ship expiring October 30, 1938. 
As part of the consideration for this extension 
the said Harriett Fawcett agrees to surrender this 
Certificate for cancellation after the expiration 
thereof as above described. 
THE SECURITY BENEFIT ASSN. 
J. M. Kirkpatrick, 
National President. 
J. V. Abrahams, 
(Seal) National Secretary.'' 
That said Certificate as endorsed was returned to said 
Harriett P. Fawcett and received and retained by her. 
7. That Harriett P. Fawcett died November 7, 
1938; that due notice and proof of death was filed by 
Plaintiff herein within ninety days from the date of 
death. 
8. The parties hereto further agree that the case 
of Walford, Administratrix, v. National Life Ins. Co., 
reported in 114 Kansas Reports 411, 219 Pacific Re-
porter 263, attached hereto, marked Exhibit "5 ", and 
made a part hereof, is a true and correct copy of the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas, being the 
highest court of said state. 
9. That the plaintiff herein, prior to the death of 
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the ~aid IIarriett P. Fawcett had not seen and did not 
know the content~ of said benefit certificate and the 
l'lldorsement thereon. 
10. It is agreed that either party hereto, or the 
Court may refer to or consider any portion of the con-
tract, consisting of Exhibits ''1", "~'' and "3", which 
rhey deem pertinent to the issues herein, and in the 
e\ent of an appeal from the decision of the District 
Court either party n1ay incorporate in the abstract of 
the record any portion of said contract which they may 
deem pertinent, but that it shall not be necessary to 
copy the entire contract in the record on appeal." 
The Trial Court in written conclusions of law, 
based upon the Agreed Statement of Facts, found that 
said Benefit Certificate was on November 7, 1938, the 
date of the death of Harriett P. Fawcett, by virtue of 
the provisions for extended insurance contained in para-
graph 6 of said Certificate, in full force and effect for 
death benefits only in the sum of $1000.00, and that 
plaintiff was entitled to judgment against defendant 
for said sum. (Abst. 30-31) 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS. 
The Defendant, Appellant herein, contends that the 
Trial Court erred in the following particulars: 
1. The court erred in finding that the stipulated 
facts are sufficient to support a judgment in favor of 
the plaintiff and against the defendant; that said stipu-
lated facts are insufficient to support, sustain, or 
jnstify the decision, conclusions of law, and judgment 
rendered by the District Court. 
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2. The court erred in signing and entering the con-
clusions of law and judgment submitted by respondents, 
and particularly in its conclusion of law that Benefit 
Certificate No. 911864, dated February 14, 1922, issued 
to Harriett P. Fawcett by the defendant association, 
was on November 7, 1938, the date of the death of Har-
riett P. Fawcett, by virtue of the provision for extended 
insurance contained in Paragraph VI of said certifi-
cate, in full force and effect for death benefit only, in 
the sum of $1,000.00, and in rendering judgment there-
for. 
3. That the court erred in denying appellant's mo-
tion for a new trial. 
4. That the decision rendered by the District Court 
is against law. 
All of the above errors involve the same questions 
and will be discussed together. 
QUESTIONS INVOLVED. 
The principal question involved in this case is 
whether the payment made February 18, 1922, paid for 
insurance to March 18, 1922, or whether it paid the 
assessment for the month of February, 1922, requiring 
another payment to pay the assessment for the period 
commencing March 1, 1922, and whether subsequent 
payments were for the period commencing on the first 
day of each subsequent month or for the period com-
mencing on the 18th day of the month. 
A second question involved is the effect of the 
endorsement placed upon the Certificate January 18, 
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l~l~9, which stated specifically the Certificate expired 
~ . 
October 30, 1938. 
A third question involYed i~ whether plaintiff as 
beneficiary of Harriett P. Fa·wcett is estopped to claim 
rights inconsistent with the terms of the endorsement. 
A fourth question involved is whether, under the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Con-
~titution, the Laws of Kansas control the rights of all 
members of Defendant Association, including the date 
·when subsequent assessments become due. 
BRIEF AND ARGUMENT. 
I. 
THE ASSESSMENT PAID WHEN THE CERTIFI-
CATE WAS DELIVERED FEBRUARY 18, 1922, WAS 
FOR THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY, 1922, AND A NEW 
ASSESSMENT BECAME PAYABLE FOR THE PERIOD 
COMMENCING MARCH 1, 1922, AND FOR THE PE-
RIOD COMMENCING ON THE FIRST DAY OF EACH 
SUCCEEDING MONTH. 
(a) Method of Operation of Fraternal Benefit So-
cieties. 
At the outset of this argument we wish to call the 
Court's attention to the fact that the defendant is a fra-
tenlal benefit society and not an old line insurance com-
pany. The universal practice of fraternal benefit so-
cieties is to levy monthly assessments, or as mentioned 
iu Bacon on Life and Accident Insurance, Fourth Edi-
tion, page 33, ''In the societies the fund is obtained 
hy periodical taxes upon the membership, at stated in-
1 <•1-vals, or as required, sufficient to meet the demand.'' 
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This Court, in the case of White v. W. 0. W., 87 
Utah 4 77, 50 P. ( 2d) 422, had under consideration the 
difference between fraternal benefit societies and old 
line life insurance companies, and in the opinion re-
ferred to the distinction as defined by :Mr. Justice 
Holmes of the United States Supreme Court: 
"The nature of the relationship between the 
deceased member and the defendant must be under-
stood in order to have a clear notion of the law 
applicable to the case. Such relationship is well ex-
pressed by lVIr. Justice Holmes in the case of Su-
preme Lodge, K. P. v. Mims, 241 U.S. 574, at page 
580, 36 S. Ct. 702, 704, 60 L. Ed. 1179, L. R. A. 
1916F, 919: 
''Persons who join institutions of this sort are 
not dealing at arm's length with a stranger whose 
mode of providing for payment does not concern 
them, but only his promise to pay. They are join-
ing a club the members of which have to pay any 
benefit that any member can receive. The cor-
poration is simply the machine for collection and 
distribution.'' 
The White case further discloses how fraternal benefit 
societies are still operating on the assessment plan, and 
when necessary may levy extra or multiple assessments, 
and are not operating on the level premium plan. See 
also Jenkins v. Talbot, 338 Ill. 441, 170 N. E. 735. 
The contract in question shows clearly that the 
member agreed to pay monthly assessments and not 
merely life insurance premiums in payment for insur-
ance for a specified period of time. 
Section 103 of the By-laws of the Defendant (Abst. 
49), a part of the contract, provides that every member 
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is required to pay an assessm.ent each month. Section 
48 provides that the National Executive Committee 
shall le,·y extra or special assessments when necessary. 
Section 112 provides that if the assessment is not paid 
on or before the last day of the month, the member be-
comes suspended ( Abst. 49). 
(b) Contract may fix premium due date prior to 
anniversary of effective date of Policy. 
~~t the outset of this case plaintiff made the con-
tention that defendant did not have the legal right to 
require subsequent premiums to be paid on a date other 
than the anniversary of the effective date of the Cer-
tificate. However, plaintiff has apparently abandoned 
this contention. 
It is well established, with but very few exceptions, 
that an insurance organization may fix the date for pay-
ment of premiums, although the policy does not go into 
effect on a date corresponding to a date fixed for such 
subsequent premiums. The rule is stated in 32 C. J. 
Insurance, 1196, Sec. 329, as follows: 
"Although there is authority to the contrary, 
the general rule is that the fact that the policy does 
not go into effect on a date corresponding to the 
date fixed for payment of subsequent premiums, 
does not change the provisions of the contract as 
to when such subsequent premiums become pay-
able." 
The same rule is announced in 6 A. L. R. 775, as fol-
lows: 
"When a policy, conditioned to take effect on 
the payment of the first premium, expressly speci-
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fies the date from which the premium period is to 
be computed, and makes that date the day all the 
recurring premiums are due and payable, such date 
must control, regardless of the date on which the 
policy is delivered.'' 
There are complete annotations on this subject in 6 
A. L. R. 774, 32 A. L. R. 1253, 80 A. L. R. 957, and 111 
A. L. R. 1420. See also Wolford' Adm'x. v. National Life 
Ins. Co., 114 Kan. 411, 219 P. 263. As this right is not 
now seriously questioned by plaintiff, we will not pro-
long this brief by citing authorities on this question. 
The above rule applies to fraternal contracts with 
much more force than to old line contracts. In an old 
line company the longer the applicant waits to pay his 
first premium the shorter the period of protection he 
receives in return for this premium. In a fraternal so-
ciety the member may, if he desires, wait until the first 
day of the next month to pay his first assess~ent and 
by so doing will receive a full month's protection in 
return for the monthly assessment in addition to a 
month's grace period. The choice is left to the member. 
Plaintiff stresses the point that an applicant whose 
Certificate is not delivered until the last day of the 
month would receive but one day's insurance in return 
for his monthly assessment. This is not correct. She 
would receive insurance protection for the entire month 
which follows, by reason of the grace period contained 
in the contract (Constitution and Laws, Sec. 103, 112, 
Abst. 49, 50.) In Mrs. Fawcett's case, if she had never 
paid another assessment after the first she still would 
have received one month and ten day's insurance protec-
tion in return for one monthly assessment. 
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(c) The Contract provides for payments for each 
calendar month. 
Plaintiff and defendant agree that the main ques-
tion inYolved is, .. \Yhat does the contract provide 1" 
Plaintiff claims that the Certificate and By-laws taken 
together provided that the first payment paid for in-
surance from the 18th day of February to the 17th day 
of l\tlarch; that the next payment paid for insurance 
from the 18th day of ~larch to the 17th day of April, 
etc. Defendant contends that the assessment paid when 
the Certificate was delivered was the assessment ''for 
the month in which the Certificate is delivered" as re-
quired by Section 103 of the By-laws (Exhibit 3, Abst. 
49); that the next assessment "became due and payable 
on the first day of the month'' ( lVIarch), but the member 
was permitted to pay such assessment and dues ''on or 
before the last day of the month,'' as provided in Sec-
tion 112 of the By-laws (Abst. 49, 50), and as provided 
in the Certificate which requires payment of $2.35 ''to 
be paid within each month to the Financier of the Local 
Council;'' that the last assessment paid to September 
30, 1928, and that the extended protection of 10 years 
and thirty days expired October 30, 1938. 
An examination of the contract will disclose that 
there is no ambiguity and no inconsistency; that the en-
tire contract is in accordance with defendant's conten-
tion that each monthly assessment became payable on 
the first day of each succeeding month and had to be 
paid on or before the last day of the month. The Cer-
tificate itself provides as follows (Abst. 42): 
''In consideration of the statements, answers 
and agreements in the application of the member, 
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which by this contract are made warranties, and in 
further consideration of the first monthly contribu-
tion of $2.35 paid before or at the time of the de-
livery of this Certificate, and thereafter $2.35 to 
be paid within each month to the Financier of the 
Local Council, for a completed period of twenty 
years from the date of the first payment thereon:'' 
(Italics ours.) 
When the Certificate of Harriett P. Fawcett was 
delivered, she was required to pay one assessment and 
Local Council dues "for the month in which the Cer-
tificate was delivered" (February, 1922), and "there-
after on or before the last day of each succeeding month" 
she was required, without notice, to pay the sum of one 
assessment and the local dues to the Financier. (Ex. 3, 
Sec. 103, Abst. 49) 
Therefore the assessment and dues for the month 
of March became due and payable on the first day of 
March, but the member was permitted to pay such 
assessment and dues on or before the last day of the 
month (Ex. 3, Sec. 112, Abst. 49.) 
Plaintiff contends that the term "first day of the 
month" as used in the By-laws, does not mean first day 
of the month, but on the contrary means the 18th day 
of the month, and that the term "last day of the 
month" as used in the By-laws, means the 17th day of 
the following month, and also contends that the term 
"within each month" as used in the Certificate, means 
any time between the 18th day of one month and the 
17th day of the following month. 
Plaintiff in his complaint was unable to find any 
language designating the day on which assessments be-
came due, which was more appropriate than that used 
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by defendant in the contract. lie uses the same lan-
guage as that contained in the contract, but changes the 
date. The eoutract provides "all a~sessments for every 
month shall became due and payable on the first day of 
the rnonth" (Ex. 3, Sec. 112, pages 57, 58, Abst. 49.) 
Plaintiff alleges (Abst. 5) "that each payment there-
after fell due on the 18th day of each month." It is dif-
ficult to understand how anyone could claim that the 
term ''on the first day of the month,'' as used in Sec-
tion 112 of Defendant's By-laws, means "on the 18th 
day of each month'' as alleged by plaintiff in his com-
plaint. Defendant's interpretation is consistent with the 
language used in the contract. Plaintiff's interpretation 
changes the language of the contract. 
When the term "first day of the month" is used, 
whether it is in a contract, a journal entry, lease, or any 
other instrument, it means but one thing, which fact is 
universally understood. This term is probably used more 
often than almost any other legal term. Leases provide 
that rent shall be payable on a certain day of the month. 
Journal Entries provide that alimony shall be paid on a 
certain day of the month. Yet the meaning of such terms 
is never questioned, because they are as clear as the 
English language can make them. 
There are several cases in the United States which 
interpret the term ''first day of each month,'' ''monthly 
premiums,'' and similar language. 
In the case of Sov. Camp W. 0. W. v. Rhyne, 171 
Miss 687, 158 So. 472, a notice attached to the policy 
provided that assessments should be paid on or before 
the first day of each month. The Court interpreted this 
as meaning on or before March 1, 1933. This, although 
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the Certificate itself was not dated until February 6, 
1924. 
The case of Craig v. Golden· Rule Life Ins. Co., 
184 Ark. 48, · 41 S. W. (2d) 769, is quite similar 
to the instant case. In this case the policy was delivered 
October 10, 1929, and provided that subsequent pay-
ments should be due ''on or before the first day of each 
month during the current calendar year, and monthly 
in advance thereafter . . . '' The policy further pro-
vided for a grace period of twenty days. The insured 
failed to pay the premium due June 1st on or before 
June 20th, and was killed June 29th. The Court in the 
opinion stated: 
"It is insisted for appellants that, October 
lOth being the day the policy was delivered and re-
ceived by the insured,. it thereafter fixed the lOth 
day of each succeeding month as the due date of 
the premium thereon, and, the insured being en-
titled to . 20 days' grace on the payment of pre-
miums, the policy was in force on June 29; 1930, 
when the insured was killed. 
The meaning of the contract is clear and un-
ambiguous, and its terms were well understood and 
recognized by the insured and the insurer. The 
application made on September 28, 1929, recited 
that the second premium would be due on Novem-
ber 1, 1929; the policy was dated October 9,. 1929, 
the day it was mailed to the insured, and recited 
that it was granted in consideration of the appli-
cation and the payment of 85 cents on or before 
the 1st day of October, 1929, and a like payment on 
or before the 1st of each month during the calendar 
year and monthly payments in advance thereafter, 
increasing annually on January 1st of each year in 
accordance with the cash savings step rate plan." 
(Italics ours.) 
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Here again the language '• on or before the first of 
eaeh month" is interpreted in accordance with De-
fendant's eontention, and the Court held that this lan-
g·uage is ''clear and unambiguous.'' 
In the case of ...lloran v. Knights of Columbus, 46 
Utah 397, 151 Pac. 353, the By-laws provided for for-
feiture of membership where the member failed to pay 
his assessment ''within thirty days from the first day 
of the month in which levied." This Court also took for 
granted that the By-laws meant what they said and that 
the "first day of the month" did not mean the lOth, 
18th or 25th day of the month. Although the opinion 
does not state, an examination. of the record in that case 
will undoubtedly disclose that the certificate was de-
livered on a date later than the first of the month. 
In the case of Kennedy v. M. W. A., 92 Utah 487, 
69 P. (2d) 508, the certificate, according to the opinion, 
was issued August 24, 1928, but this Court stated in the 
course of the opinion that Kennedy paid his dues and 
premiums for a period of 34 months but stopped pay-
ment of premiums and his policy lapsed and became 
void for non-payment of premiums July 1, 1931 (includ-
ing one month's grace period,) and he lost his member-
ship standing in the Order. The 34 monthly premiums· 
paid from August, 1928, to :May, 1931, both months in-
clusive, yet the Certificate was not issued until August· 
24, 1928. 
Hundreds of cases can be cited in which the Courts 
have decided without question that the contracts, using 
almost identical language as that used by defendant in 
this case, became void at midnight of the last day of 
the calendar month. It is significant that in the hun-
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dreds or even thousands of cases interpreting fraternal 
contracts, that no one, up to this time, with possibly one 
exception, has seen fit to even contend that the terms 
''first day of the month,'' ''during the month,'' etc., 
meant anything other than a month as fixed by the calen-
dar, although in many cases a decision so holding would 
enable their clients to recover. 
As stated above, an examination of the contract as 
a whole will disclose that the terms ''first day of the 
month," "last day of the month," "within each 
month,'' etc., were intended to mean and were under-
stood by the insured to mean but one thing, and that is 
the first day of each month as fixed by the calendar. 
In addition to the Sections of the Constitution and 
Laws hereinbefore referred to, they contain other ref-
erences to certain days in the month. Section 159 ( Abst. 
50, 51) provides that the Financier shall on or before 
the 5th day of each month make a full and complete 
report of all assessments paid for or by each member 
of the Subordinate Council for the preceding month, 
and shall forward the same with remittance not later 
than the 15th day of the month (Italics ours.) It will be 
noted that this report is made of payments by members 
"for the preceding month." If plaintiff's interpreta-
tion of the contract were adopted and each member's 
monthly payment covered a different period of time, it 
would be impossible to determine what is meant by the 
term "the prceeding month." It is only when de-
fendant's interpretation is adopted that this Section of 
the By-laws has any meaning. Furthermore it· is ap-
parent that the Financier is to make only one report, 
and that report is to be made on the 5th day of each 
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month. The remittance is to be made not later than the 
15th day of the month. We do not believe even plain-
tiff would contend that this term, as used in Section 
159, is ambiguous, yet it is used in the same contract 
and uses the same lang·uage as that contained in Sec-
tions 103 and 112. 
Plaintiff in the Trial Court contended, however, 
that the use in the Certificate of the term "first 
monthly contribution" means that the first contribu-
tion paid for a full month's insurance. Nearly all as-
sessinents levied against fraternal certificate holders 
are monthly assessments, although occasionally assess-
ments are levied quarterly. The term "first monthly 
assessment" is explained in Section 103 of the By-laws 
(Abst. 49.) It is the assessment and Local Council dues · 
"for the month in which the Certificate is delivered." 
In Shira v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 90 Fed. (2d) 953, the 
insurance policy was dated January 7, 1930, and was 
delivered to the insured January 16, 1930, on which date 
the insured paid the first quarterly premium. Subse-
quent quarterly premiums, by the terms of the policy, 
became due on April 2, 1930, and a like sum on said date 
every three calendar months thereafter during the life 
of the insured. The Court held that it was consistent 
for parties to a life insurance contract to make such 
stipulations with reference to the effective date of the 
policy, the period which the initial payment shall cover, 
and the times when the future premiums shall become 
due, and such stipulations are binding on the parties, 
and further held that the extended insurance ran from 
the date the premium fell due. Here the term "quarterly 
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premium'' was similar to the term ''monthly contribu-
tion'' used in the instant case. 
In the case of Frysh v. Commercial Casttalty Ins. 
Co., 214 Wis. 453, 253 N. W. 184, the policy provided 
that, "In consideration of the policy fee of Two and 
N o/100 Dollars and the monthly premium of Two and 
30/100 Dollars" (Italics ours), the insurance was car-
ried to May 1st, ''and for such time thereafter as the 
premiums paid by the insured, as herein agreed, shall 
maintain this policy in force." The policy became ef-
fective April 15, 1931. The deceased made two other 
monthly payments. It was Defendant's contention that 
the first of the monthly payments kept the policy in 
force from April 15th to May 1st, and that the other 
two carried the policy to July 1st. Plaintiff's conten-
tion is that l\fike Frysh paid $2.00 for a policy fee and 
three monthly premiums amounting to $6.90, and that 
the policy having gone into effect on April 15th the 
three monthly premiums should carry the policy to 
July 15th. The Court, in sustaining defendant's conten-
tion, said: 
''Insofar as the policy is corrected, it is un-
ahbiguous and this conclusion is inescapable. There 
is no room for construction." (Italics ours.) 
This, although the policy referred to the premium as 
"monthly premiums," similar to the language "monthly 
contributions'' as used in defendant's contract in the 
instant case. The Court further stated: 
"It seems to us not unreasonable that an in-
surance company should desire to have its premium 
payments operate on the insurance as of the first 
of the month.'' 
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Plaintiff in the Trial Court contended that to give 
the Certificate the construction contended for by De-
fendant results in one of three conclusions: either that 
the first contribution was for term insurance from the 
date of payment to March 1, 1922, or that it covered a 
period from February 1, 1922, to March 1, 1922, or that 
it was not a full month's contribution. As to the first 
contention, we will say definitely that this was not term 
insurance. As to the second contention, the assessment 
was for "the month in which the Certificate was de-
livered,'' or the month of February, 1922, although the 
applicant did not become a member until February 18th. 
The answer to the second contention also answers the 
third. The assessment was a monthly assessment. 
Plaintiff's final contention is that the construction 
placed upon the above language by defendant requires 
241 monthly payments to be made on a Twenty Pay Life 
Certificate. The language of the Certificate is as fol-
lows: 
"In consideration of the statements, answers 
and agreements in the application of the member, 
which by this contract are made warranties, and in 
further consideration of the first monthly con-
tribution of $2.35 paid before or at the time of the 
delivery of this Certificate, and thereafter $2.35 
to be paid within each month to the Financier of 
the Local Council, for a completed period of twenty 
years from the date of -the first payment thereon:" 
This clause is not in issue in this lawsuit, for the reason 
that the member at no time made payments for the full 
period of twenty years. If the question should ever 
arise as to whether or not the member was required to 
make 240 or 241 payments in order to pay up her Cer-
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tificate, then the question of the correct interpretation 
of this clause might become important. However, this 
clause contained in the Certificate is not inconsistent 
with Defendant's contention. According to Defendant's 
interpretation, "within each month" would mean on or 
before the 30th or 31st day of each calendar month. 
According to Plaintiff's interpretation the term "within 
each month" means on or before the 17th day of each 
succeeding calendar month. Under neither interpreta-
tion is a two hundred forty-first payment required to be 
paid until after the expiration of the "completed period 
of twenty years from the date of the first payment 
thereon.'' Similar language has been under considera-
tion by the Courts and has been given the construction 
contended for by defendant. In the case of Minnesota 
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 29 F. (2d) 977, 979, in 
which the question of when a life insurance premium 
became due was involved, the Court made the following 
remark: 
"An obligation is due during the entire period 
during which it may be paid, whether that period 
extends over one day, three days, or thirty days. 
The premium was not really due, in the sense that 
the failure to pay it would result in a forfeiture of 
the policy, until the grace period had expired.'' 
Using the same language in the instant case, a 241st 
premium was not due, in the sense that the failure to 
pay it would result in the forfeiture of the policy, until 
after the maturity of the policy. 
It is necessary to use the language ''twenty years 
from the date of the first payment thereon" for the rea-
son that the applicant had sixty days after the date of 
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issuance of his Certificate within which to pay the first 
a~8essment. (Section 96 Constitution and Laws. Abst. 
-iS) ln the instant case if _Mr~. 11--,a,n.·ett had not paid her 
first assessment until the 14th of April, her Certificate 
would not have become paid up until the 14th of April, 
1942, thus requiring 240 payments. Twenty years from 
the date of issuance would have required but 238 pay-
ments. However, as stated above, this provision of the 
contract is not in question in the instant case, but was 
raised solely in au attempt to inject some ambiguity into 
an unambiguous contract. 
Plaintiff's Attorneys in the trial court cited but 
two cases which, they claim, tend to sustain their con-
tention. The first is the case of Sov. Camp W. 0. W. v. 
Reed, 94 S. 910 (Ala.) The second is Rybczynski v. Chi-
cago Fraternal Life Assurance Co., 277 N. Y. S. 366. 
We believe the case of Rybczynski v. Chicago Fra-
ternal Life Assurance Co., 227 N. Y. S. 366, tends to 
sustain Defendant's rather than Plaintiff's contention. 
The contract stated that payment would be due on the 
first day of the calendar month of the quarterly period. 
A prior Certificate, which was not accepted, was issued 
January 27, 1926. The Certificate which was accepted 
was dated February 3, 1926. The Court held that the 
provision that the payments were due on the first day 
of the calendar month and must be paid on or before 
the last day of the month indicated that payments 
should be made during the month of February, 1927. 
The only definite holding in the Rybczynski case on this 
point was that the member had the remainder of the 
month of February, 1927, in which to make payment. 
The Court nowhere held that he had to and including 
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March 2nd. As stated above this holding tends to sus-
tain Defendant's contention rather than that of plain-
tiff. 
As to the Reed case, 94 S. 910 (Ala.), the member 
paid the December payment on December 31, 1919, and 
paid two subsequent payments, and in addition had a 
grace period of one month. Clearly the Certificate was 
in force under any possible theory on the 25th day of 
February, 1920. The .Court, although it was not neces-
sary, in rendering a decision for. the Plaintiff, inter-
preted the term "monthly premium" as meaning the 
calendar month to follow, not the calendar month which 
expired on the day the monthly premium was paid. 
Whether it was for the month of December, 1919, or 
January, 1920, is immaterial, because the assessments 
paid continued the Certificate in force to and within the 
month of March, 1920. 
It is apparent from an examination of the cases 
cited by the Alabama Court in support of its dicta de-
fining the term "month," that the Court failed to an-
alyze the cases upon which it relied. All of the cases cited 
interpreted the term calendar ''month'' as used in con-
tracts and statutes as distinguished from a lunar month. 
At common law the term "month" meant a lunar month. 
It was necessary by Statute in most states to provide 
that the term "month" meant a calendar month. (See 
Rev. St. Utah 1933, Sec. 82-2-12 (1); G. S. Kan. 1935, Sec. 
77 .,.201 ( 11).) In the case of Warfield Nat ural Gas Co. v. 
Clark, 257 Ky. 724, 79 S. W. (2d) 21, 97 A. L. R. 971, the 
Court carefully considered the Reed case and all other 
decided cases on the point, and made the following logi-
cal analysis : 
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"On the second proposition [that the word 
'month' a~ used in the contract between the parties 
denotes the period between a day of a calendar 
month and the corresponding day ~f the succeeding 
calendar month], there seems to be a confusion of 
authority with no cases cited that are directly in 
point. In 5 \Y ords and Phrases, First Series, p. 
467 4, it is said : "At common law the word 'month' 
when used without qualification, meant a lunar 
month, or twenty-eight days. [Citing authorities.] 
. . . Which rule was abolished by statute in F~ng­
land in 1850. [Citing authorities.] In the United 
States the common-law rule was followed in some 
of the earlier cases. [Citing authorities.] But the 
holdings now seem to be uniform that the word, in 
whatever connection it is used, signifies a calendar 
month unless a contrary intent is indicated, and in 
many states this rule has been fixed by statute. 
[Citing authorities, including Pyle v. Maulding, 30 
Ky. (17 J. J. Marsh.) 202; Hardin v. Major, 7 Ky. 
(4 Bibb) 104, 105; Hopkins v. Chambers, 23 Ky. 
(7 T. B. Mon.) 257, 262]." 
"In the case of McGinn v. State, 46 Neb. 427, 
65 N. W. 46, 47, 30 L. R. A. 450, 50 Am. St. Rep. 
617, cited by counsel for appellant, it is said: "The 
term 'calendar month,' whether employed in stat-
utes or contracts, and not appearing to have been 
used in a different sense, denotes a period termi-
nating with the day of the succeeding month nu-
merically corresponding to the day of its beginning, 
less one. If there be no corresponding day of the 
succeeding month, it terminates with the last day 
thereof.'' 
"The case of Daley v. Anderson, 7 Wyo. 1, 48 
P. 839, 75 Am. St. Rep. 870, cited by counsel for 
appellant, is to the same effect. See also, State v. 
White, 73 Fla. 426, 74 So. 486; Page v. O'Sullivan, 
159 Ky. 703, 169 S. W. 542. In the long list of cases 
cited and in Words and Phrases, supra, and in 
many other caRes not cited, it is held that the word 
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''month'' as used in statutes, eon tracts, etc., means 
a calendar month as disting·uished from the lunar 
month, unless the contrary is expressed. But the 
controversy between counsel here is whether the 
term ''calendar month'' means only a month as 
delimited by the calendar or may also mean a pe-
riod beginning on a day in one calendar month and 
running to a corresponding day in the succeeding 
month. Counsel for appellee of course held to the 
former view and cite 62 C. J. 969; 26 R. C. L. 732; 
Sovereign Camp W. 0. W., v. Reed, 208 Ala. 457, 
94 So. 910; Fairchild-Gilmore-Wilton Co. v. South-
ern Refining Co., 158 Cal. 264, 110 P. 951, 953; Ky. 
Stat. Sec. '452, and subdivision 25 of section 732 of 
the Civil Code of Practice. The section of the stat-
ute cited is in a chapter relating to the construc-
tion of statutes, and the section of the Code cited 
relates to the construction of provisions of the 
Code. The case of Fairchild-Gilmore-Wilton Co. v. 
Southern Refining Co. is more directly in point 
than any of the other authorities cited. In that case 
two contracts had been made. One made January 
3, 1906, was for the sale of 4,000 tons of asphalt to 
be delivered within one year from January 1, the 
delivery to be made as rapidly as possible, pro-
vided that not more than 400 tons were to be called 
for in any one month. Payments were to be made 
on the lOth day of each month for all material de-
livered during the preceding month. The second 
contract was made on ~fay 6, 1906, and is identical 
in language with the first, except as to date, and 
the time in which the asphalt was to be t~ken, 
which was one year from May 16, 1906, and further 
that the asphalt furnished under the contract was 
to be in addition to the amount to be furnished 
under the former contract. In summing up the eon-
elusion as to the construction to be given the terms 
of the contract, it was said: "We think the proper 
construction of the contract of May 16th is that by 
the 'one month,' therein referred to, a calendar 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
month was intended and understood. This is shown 
by the clause immediately following, to the effect 
that payments 'll'ere to ue made on the 10th of each 
maJllh for all the a~phnlt delivered during the pre-
ceding month. EYidently both of these kindred pro-
visions refer to the months of the rnlendar." (Ital-
ics ours.) 
"In Derby v. Dancey, 112 La. 891, 36 So. 795, 
796, it is said: ''A month is a definite period of 
time, commencing on the 1st day thereof, and end-
ing on the 28th, 29th, 30th, or 31st day." 
''From an exhaustive research of authorities, 
in addition to those cited by counsel for the re-
spective parties, we have been unable to find any 
fixed rules for determining the meaning of the 
word "month" as used in contracts, aiid the failure 
to find such a rule is not disappointing, since it is 
apparent at first blush that the meaning of the 
term, like many others used in contracts, must be 
determined from the particular sense in which it is 
used. Where there is doubt or ambiguity in the 
language of a contract, courts will resort to estab-
lished rules of construction in determining its 
meaning. As will be seen from the quoted provi-
sions of the contract, the amount payable for gas 
furnished during each month shall be due on the 
1st day of the following month, and unless paid on 
or before the 15th of each month, the gas will be 
shut off without further notice. 
"In Webster's New International Dictionary, 
the words ''calendar month'' are defined as '' ( 1) 
any of the months as adjusted in the calendar, now 
the Gregorian. April, June, September, and N ovem-
ber now contain 30 days, and the rest 31, except 
February, which has 28, and in leap years, 29. (2) 
The time from any day of such a month to the cor-
responding day (if any; if not, to the last day) of 
the next month.'' 
''Standing alone, the quoted excerpt from the 
rules and regulations on the reverse side of the 
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application would clearly indicate that the word 
''month'' was used in the sense as first defined in 
the dictionary, and this construction should be 
adopted unless the instrument as a whole indicates 
that it was used in the other sense, or unless it 
should be made to appear that, by their course of 
dealing under the contract, the parties themselves 
put the latter construction upon it. When consid-
ered as a whole, there is nothing in tbe contract to 
indicate that the term was used other than in the 
sense of a month as adjusted or delimited by the 
calendar, nor is there any proof as to the conduct 
or dealings of the parties under it to warrant a 
conclusion that they gave it any other construc-
tion. The use of the kindred terms "each month," 
"on the first day of the following month," and the 
"5th of each month," as said in Fairchild-Gil-
more-Wilton Co. v. Southern Refining Co., supra, 
indicates not only a "calendar month" but "a 
month of the calendar" was meant and understood." 
(Italics ours.) 
We believe the conclusion is inescapable that the con-
tract issued by Defendant to Harriett P. Fawcett was 
clear and unambiguous; that the terms "the first day of 
each month," "within each month," "assessment for the 
month in which the Certificate is delivered" and "on or 
before the last day of each succeeding month'' are per-
fectly clear, and that the Certificate of Harriett P. Faw-
cett, as extended, became null and void on October 30, 
1938. 
(d) The construction placed upon the contract by 
the parties thereto is controlling. 
It is universally recognized that the intention of the 
parties to a contract is the controlling element to be con-
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sidered. This rule is well ~tated 111 1 Couch on Insur-
ance, page 346, a8 follo~ws: 
''The rule of interpretation of insurance con-
tracts, and the first object of construction, is to 
ascertain the intention· or meaning of the parties, 
and the duty of the courts is to construe the con-
tract accordingly.'' 
Couch further announces the rule for ascertaining the 
intention of the parties as follows: (P. 351) 
"However, the meaning of an insurance con-
tract may be measured by the conduct of all the 
parties thereto, if the terms of the contract, when 
reasonably construed, are in harmony with that 
conduct, since, where the parties have themselves 
placed a construction on certain provisions of the 
contract, and the same is neither in conflict with 
any language therein, nor violative of statute, reg·-
ulation, or public policy, the courts will adopt such 
construction. And when the parties to an ambig-
uous insurance contract, by their own acts, place a 
construction upon it, that construction is the best 
evidence of what the contract was actually intended 
to mean." (Italics ours.) 
In the case of Scotten v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 
336 Mo. 724, 81 S. W. (2d) 313, the Court held that al-
though the policy was ambiguous as to whether the 
premiums were due on the anniversary of the date of 
the policy or on the anniversary of its delivery, this 
required a construction of the policy as it was under-
stood and acted upon by the insured and the insurer. 
The Court held : 
"It is a well established rule of law that the 
construction placed upon a contract by the parties, 
as evidenced by their acts, conduct or declarations 
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indicating a mutual intent and understanding, will 
be adopted by the Courts where the language of 
the contract is ambiguous, or there is reasonable 
doubt as to its meaning, but not where it is plain 
and unambiguous.'' 
There is no evidence whatever that Harriett P. 
Fawcett did not understand the contract in question as 
requiring payments to be made during the month of 
March, 1922, and during each calendar month there-
after. The Agreed Statement of ·Facts discloses that 
she made her final payment on September 30, 1928, 
which was the final date for making that monthly pay-
ment, according to Defendant's theory. While this evi-
dence is slight, it indicates that Mrs. Fawcett followed 
the all too human habit of waiting until the last day to 
make her payments. Outside of this, the only evidence 
as to the understanding of the parties is the rider at-
tached to the Certificate. This rider is clear, unam-
biguous and not open to construction. If this rider is 
held not to be a new contract, it still should be given 
the greatest weight in determining the intention of the 
parties. The rider expresses the interprtation as under-
stood by Defendant, it expresses the interpretation of 
the contract as practiced by all fraternal societies and 
other assessment insurance organizations, and expresses 
the interpretation of the contract as accepted by the 
Courts without question in thousands of reported cases, 
and unquestionably expresses the interpretation of the 
insured Harriett P. Fawcett. We wish to set out the 
language of the rider in full in this Brief for the con-
sideration of the Court. The endorsement provides as 
follows: 
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''January 18, 1929. 
The Security Benefit Association, upon the re-
quest of the said Harriett P. Fawcett, hereby 
waives the periodical contributions stipulated in 
this Certificate of membership and continues Whole 
Life Protection for death benefits only, in the sum 
of $1000.00 for ten years and thirty days from 
October 1, 1928, this Certificate of membership ex-
piring Octo her 30, 1938. 
As part of the consideration for this extension 
the said Harriett Fawcett agrees to surrender this 
Certificate for cancellation after the expiration 
thereof as above described. 
THE SECURITY BENEFIT ASSN. 
J. M. Kirkpatrick, 
National President. 
J. V. Abrahams, 
(Seal) National Secretary.'' 
It will be noted that in two different places the 
rider is specific as to the period covered. It states that 
the insured is entitled to death benefits only in the sum 
of $1000.00 ''for ten years and thirty days from Octo-
ber 1, 1928." Again it states, "this Certificate of mem-· 
bership expiring October 30, 1938.'' Certainly there is 
nothing ambiguous about this rider. It was received 
and retained by Harriett P. Fawcett for over ten years 
without objection. 
The rule is well stated in 32 Corpus Juris, Insur-
ance, page 1129, Sec. 233, as follows: 
"In the absence of fraud, the unconditional 
delivery of a policy corresponding with the terms 
of the application consummates the contract. By 
the delivery of the policy to insured he is put on 
notice of the conditions therein expressed. Also, in 
the absence of fraud or mistake, a policy of in-
surance, on acceptance thereof, becomes a valid and 
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binding contract; it is the final contract between 
the parties, superseding all preliminary agreements 
and negotiations; it is conclusive as to the engage-
ments of both parties in respect to the obligations 
declared in it; insured is bound by, and is con-
clusively presumed to have knowledge of, and to 
have assented to, all the terms, conditions, limita-
tions, or other provisions or recitals, in the policy, 
including statements in the application where it is 
expressly made a part of the policy." 
Corpus Juris further states the rule on page 1139 as 
follows: (Sec. 246) 
''Likewise by accepting and retaining the 
policy or other final written contract of insurance 
for a considerable period of time, without objec-
tion, he waives any departure in the contents of 
the policy or contract from the application, pre-
liminary agreement, or other prior instrument, and 
is estopped and precluded from asserting that it 
is not his contract. Ordinarily failure of insured 
to read or examine the policy is such negligence as 
estops him from asserting that it is not his con-
tract. . . . " 
This endorsement is the strongest evidence of the 
interpretation of the contract in question. The rider 
was short, plain and unambiguous. The presumption is 
that Harriett P. Fawcett read it and by accepting and 
retaining it for a period of over ten years she certainly 
led Defendant to believe that this was her understand-
ing of the contract. Unquestionably this rider did ex-
press her interpretation of the contract, as it expressed 
the construction placed thereon by Defendant. There is 
absolutely no evidence to the contrary. This is the 
strongest evidence of the correct construction of the 
contract. 
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II. 
THE ENDORSEMENT ON THE CERTIFICATE CON-
STITUTED A NEW CONTRACT. 
The endorsement placed upon the Certificate of 
Harriett P. Fawcett, together with the surrounding cir-
cumstances, disclose clearly that a new contract was 
consummated at that time. l\Irs. Fawcett agreed in her 
application for change to extended protection, of date 
January 6, 1929, that the extended Beneficiary Certiti-
cate should be in substitution and revocation of all 
rights and interests to which she might have been en-
titled under said Beneficiary Certificate before change. 
(Abst. 52) The endorsement placed upon the Certificate 
refers to the Certificate, but limits the terms thereof. It 
requires no citation of authorities to prove that a new 
contract need not in itself contain all the provisions, but 
may refer to a superseded contract for the remainder of 
the terms. An example is an extension agreement, which 
of itself does not contain all the terms· set forth in an 
original mortgage, but which refers to the original 
mortgage and changes some of its terms. 
On January 6, 1929, Harriett P. Fawcett did not 
have the right under her original contract, to extended 
insurance. The original Certificate provides that the 
member shall have the option to obtain extended in-
surance "provided the member has made the stipulated 
periodical contributions without default for not less 
than three years prior to the application for this priv-
ilege, and has maintained his status as a member as 
required and prescribed in the Constitution and Laws 
of the Association." (Abst. 44.) Harriett P. Faw'eett 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
36 
had not complied with this requirement and therefore 
was not entitled to extended insurance as a matter of 
right under Option VI of her contract. The Agreed 
Statement of Facts shows that the last payment made 
by Harriett P. Fawcett was on September 30, 1928, 
which payment was for the month of September (Abst. 
26.) At the time she made application for extended in-
surance she was in default in the payment of the Octo-
ber, November and December, 1928, payments. The 
terms contained in this option are similar to those under 
consideration in the ca~e of Kennedy v. M. W. A., 92 
Utah 487, 69 P. (2d) 508, in which the Court held that 
the member must be in good standing in order to have 
a contract right to extended insurance. 
Plaintiff contended and the Trial Court found that 
the endorsement had no force or effect, and that Mrs. 
Fawcett's right to extended insurance was in effect by 
virtue of the provisions for extended insurance con-
tained in the original Certificate·. This ruling obviously 
was error. 
III. 
PLAINTIFF IS ESTOPPED TO CLAIM THE CON-
TRACT DID NOT TERMINATE OCTOBER 30, 
1938. 
Plaintiff, of course, as beneficiary of Harriett P. 
Fawcett, has only the rights that she would have had 
under the contract. It is evident that Mrs. Fawcett, 
after accepting and retaining the endorsement for over 
ten years without objection, would be estopped to claim 
that it did not correctly state the understanding of the 
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partie~. The correct rule of law, as stated in 3~ Corpus 
Juris, page 1139, is herein a hove quoted, and provides 
that a party, by accepting· and retaining a written con-
tract for a considerable period of time without objec-
tion, is estopped and precluded from asserting that it 
is not his contract. This rule is universal and requires 
no further authorities. 
IV. 
UNDER THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE OF 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, THE 
LAWS OF KANSAS CONTROL THE RIGHTS OF 
ALL MEMBERS OF DEFENDANT ASSOCIATION. 
In Defendant's Answer, it pleaded its right under 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States 
Constitution to have the rights and obligations of all 
members interpreted under the Laws of Kansas. The 
Supreme Court of the United States has on numerous 
occasions sustained this right. (See Supreme Council, 
Royal Arcanum v. Green, 35 S. Ct. 724, 237 U. S. 531; 
M. W. A. v. Mixer, 45 S. Ct. 389, 267 U. S. 544.) The 
latest decision of the United States Supreme Court on 
this question was in the case of Sov. Camp W. 0. W. v. 
Bolin, 305 U. S. 66, 59 S. Ct. 35, decided November 7, 
1938, in which Mr. Justice Roberts paraphrased Mr. 
Justice Holmes' language in the Mixer case as follows: 
''First. The beneficiary certificate was not a 
mere contract to be construed and enforced accord-
ing to the laws of the state where it was delivered. 
Entry into membership of an incorporated bene-
ficiary society is more than a contract; it is enter-
ing into a complex and abiding relation and the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
38 
rights of membership are governed by the law of 
the state of incorporation. Another state, wherein 
the certificate of membership was issued, cannot 
attach to membership rights against the society 
which are refused by the law of the domicile.'' 
This Court, in the case of White v. W. 0. W., 87 
Utah 477, 50 P. (2d) 422, has recognized and followed 
the rule as announced by the United States Supreme 
Court. We quote from the opinion: 
''Decision of Supreme Court of domicile of 
fraternal benefit association held decisive on ques-
tion of association's power to levy multiple assess-
ments against holders of death benefit certifi-
cates." 
The Supreme Court of Kansas, in the case of Wolford, 
Administratrix, v. National Life Ins. Co., 114 Kan. 411, 
219 P. 263, pleaded in Defendant's Answer, held as 
follows: 
''A policy of life insurance specifically pro-
vided for the annual payment of premiums after 
the first on the anniversaries of the date of the 
policy, with a grace period of one month, and that 
a failure to pay any premium when due should for-
feit the rights of the insured and terminate the 
obligations of the insurance company under the 
policy. The ·policy was not delivered to the insured 
until 22 days after its date. Held, that the fact that 
the policy was not delivered on its date or a date 
corresponding with the times specifically fixed for 
the payments of subsequent premiums did not post-
pone the time for such payments to the anniversary 
of the date of delivery." (Syl.) 
Although, as heretofore stated in this Brief, ap-
parently plaintiff does not now question the right of 
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defendant to require subsequent premiums to be paid 
on a date prior to the anniversary of the policy, de-
fendant still insists upon it~ constitutional right to 
have the rights of its member~ interpreted in accordance 
with the Law of Kansas. 
CONCLUSION. 
From the above we believe the conclusion is ines-
capable that the evidence clearly shows: 
1. That the first assessment paid when the Certifi-
cate was delivered was the monthly assessment for the 
month in which the Certificate was delivered; that the 
next assessment was for the month of March, 1922, al-
though the member had as days of grace until midnight 
of the last day of March in which to pay said assess-
ment; that each subsequent assessment was for the pe-
riod commencing on the first day of each month as 
designated by the calendar; that the last assessment 
was for the month of September, 1928; that the ex-
tended insurance of ten years and thirty days com-
menced to run October 1, 1928, and terminated October 
30, 1938; that this was the understanding of the parties 
to the contract, as is evidenced by the fact that the 
member had in her possession for over ten years an 
endorsement so providing and at no time made any com-
plaint or objection thereto; that the endorsement placed 
upon the Certificate Jan nary 18, 1929, was, as provided 
in the application therefor, "in substitution and revoca-
tion of all rights and interest to which [she] may have 
been entitled under the said Beneficiary Certificate be-
fore change." 
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2. That the member's rights and the rights of 
plaintiff as her beneficiary are fixed and determined by 
said endorsement. 
3. That plaintiff, as beneficiary of Harriett P. 
Fawcett, is estopped to claim any rights inconsistent 
with the terms of the endorsement, and 
4. That under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of 
the United States Constitution the rights of all mem-
bers, including Harriett P. Fawcett, and of plaintiff 
as her beneficiary, must be determined under the Laws 
of Kansas, and that under such Laws the act of de-
fendant in requiring assessments after the first to be 
paid on a date prior to the anniversary of the delivery 
of the Certificate was legal and valid. 
From the above the defendant respectfully contends 
that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed 
and judgment rendered herein for the appellant, or that 
the cause be remanded for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. c. MELVILLE, 
A. w. FULTON, 
HARRY L. LADBURY, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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